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Thousands of years ago, written contracts first appeared in Mesopotamia, with small 
cuneiform triangles hammered into clay tablets.  These contracts were fairly sophisticated, 
memorializing basic credit agreements, partnership arrangements, as well as labor, sales, and rental 
agreements.1  Since these first recorded contracts, the tools used to create written contracts have 
undergone considerable change.  We no longer enter into agreements memorialized in clay; paper 
and more recently electronic agreements serve as the primary medium for the expression of 
commercial arrangements.   
 
Many argue that blockchains could foster an evolution in how legal agreements are created 
and executed, supporting a new generation of electronic contracts. Blockchain networks and 
computer programs called “smart contracts” could enable parties to memorialize all or parts of 
legal agreements.  By using this technology, contracting parties would gain the ability to create 
arrangements that are hard to modify, dynamic, and potentially less ambiguous than traditional 
legal contracts.   
 
This report assumes such a future comes to pass and examines how blockchain technology 
fits within the current common law and U.S. electronic contracting statutes, analyzing whether 
smart contracts can be used to create enforceable legal agreements.  As outlined below, we explain 
why current U.S. law largely accommodates the use of smart contracts to create binding and 
enforceable agreements. We conclude the report by analyzing whether additional state and federal 
legislation is necessary to support this new emerging technology, finding that current iterations of 
state law, designed to accommodate blockchain technology, may not be necessary, with limited 
exceptions. 
 
The report unfolds in three parts.  Part I provides a brief overview of blockchain technology 
and smart contracts, with an assumption that the reader has limited familiarity with the underlying 
technology.  Part II explores whether legal agreements relying on blockchain technology will be 
deemed enforceable. Finally, Part III evaluates whether additional legislation is necessary to 
accommodate electronic contracting involving blockchain-based smart contracts.   
 
I. Overview of Blockchain Technology and Smart Contracts 
 
The potential for blockchain technology extends far beyond payment systems such as  
Bitcoin. Blockchain technology has the potential to anchor a new generation of electronic contracts 
that offer broader capabilities than existing written agreements. In this section, we briefly unpack 
how blockchain technology works and introduce the related concept of “smart contracts.” 
 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Paul Halsall, Ancient History Sourcebook: A Collection of Contracts from Mesopotamia, c. 
2300 - 428 BCE, in Internet Ancient History Sourcebook (1999), 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/mesopotamia-contracts.html. (describing contracts for the sale of 
real estate, food, crops, and for rentals, leases, labor (employment), borrowing money, and so on). 
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A. An Overview of Blockchain Technology2 
 
Blockchains are best conceptualized as a database maintained by a distributed network of 
computers. They blend together peer-to-peer networks, public-private key cryptography, and a set 
of rules—called a “consensus mechanism”—to manage how information is recorded in the shared 
database and verified by the network.  By combining these technologies, blockchains can store 
tamper-resistant, resilient, and non-repudiable data in a transparent manner.3   
 
Unlike today’s databases, which are centrally maintained, no one single party controls a 
blockchain.  Instead they are maintained by peer-to-peer networks.  On widely supported 
blockchains, like Bitcoin and Ethereum, copies of the database are scattered across the globe, 
found on thousands of different computers at any given time.  
 
Because blockchains are redundantly replicated, any data stored in a blockchain is widely 
available and resilient. If one individual version of a blockchain is corrupted, or if a member of a 
blockchain-based network stops participating, the event is of little significance.  So long as one 
copy of a blockchain exists, other members of a network can access the information and continue 
to engage in transactions. 
 
On a blockchain-based network, anyone can setup an “account,” comprised of a public 
address (a public key) and a password (a private key). To engage in a transaction, a member of the 
network finds another user’s public key and inputs their private key, thereby sealing the transaction 
with a “digital signature.”  Through this process, all transactions are authenticated and non-
repudiable—the party that controls an account in a disputed transaction, will have a difficult time 
disputing that they did not engage in a transaction unless they can prove that their password (i.e., 
private key) was compromised. 
  
Once executed, the transaction—along with other transactions—are grouped together into 
a block, which is then encrypted to form a number called a “hash.”  Each hash is unique to a block, 
and each block stores a reference to the previous block’s hash, chaining the blocks together to form 
a sequential record of transactions on the network (hence why it is called a blockchain).   
 
By linking blocks together, blockchains become tamper-resistant.  A change to any record 
stored in a blockchain results in the generation of a new hash for a block, and thus changes the 
hash of every subsequent block in a blockchain, in effect, making the alteration readily apparent 
to those participating on the network. 
 
To ensure that data is properly recorded to a blockchain and to further increase a 
blockchain’s security, blockchain-based networks rely on a “consensus mechanism”— a set of 
rules that generally make it difficult to add information to a blockchain and even more difficult to 
tamper-with or change.   There are several different types of consensus mechanisms, but the most 
popular one currently used today is a consensus mechanism commonly called “proof of work.” 
                                                 
2 For the purpose of this report, we limit our inquiry to public, permissionless blockchains.  There are 
types of blockchains, which are private and permissioned.  They are outside the scope of this report. 
3 Arvind Narayanan et al. Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies: A Comprehensive Introduction. 
(2016). 
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The proof of work consensus mechanism is a strict procedure for adding new blocks to the 
shared database and verifying that each block contains valid transactions and a valid hash.  While 
generating a hash for any given block does not need to be a challenging task, blockchains relying 
on this type of consensus mechanism make this task difficult by requiring that a block’s hash begin 
with a dynamically adjusted number of leading zeroes. Any computer trying to generate a valid 
hash must run repeated calculations through a brute force guessing game to meet the protocol’s 
stringent requirements—a process often referred to as “mining”—forcing members of the network 
to dedicate computational resources and pay for hardware and electricity necessary to perform 
these computations. Blockchain-based networks adjust the difficulty of the guessing game, 
depending on the total computational power of the miners on the network, to ensure that the 
network adds a new block in predictable time intervals.4 
  
Through this process, a blockchain’s underlying protocol enables the network to reach 
consensus as to the state of the shared database periodically, while simultaneously preventing 
parties from creating fake transactions or otherwise altering the records stored in a blockchain.  
Because each block incorporates a hash of the preceding block, anyone trying to modify the content 
stored in a block will inevitably break the chain. And, for anyone to modify even a single record 
on a blockchain employing a proof of work consensus mechanism, a would-be attacker, or group 
of attackers, would have to go through the computationally expensive task of generating new 
hashes for every subsequent block in a blockchain at a pace that is faster than the majority of honest 
parties supporting the network, a task that have estimated costs in excess of $1 billion for the 
Bitcoin blockchain.5 
 
B. Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts as Legal Contracts 
 
Because blockchains store tamper resilient, transparent, and non-repudiable data, the 
technology is being used for far more than just maintaining records of digital currency transactions.  
Indeed, blockchains are storing or referencing, other forms of information;  blockchain-based 
protocols are layering additional technology to process what can essentially be thought of as small 
computer programs—what technologists often refer to as “smart contracts.” 6 
 
The first blockchain to enable the creation and deployment of sophisticated smart contracts 
was the Ethereum blockchain.7  Announced in February of 2014, and launched roughly a year and 
a half later, Ethereum implements a blockchain and a decentralized computing platform (the 
Ethereum Virtual Machine), which processes a Turing-complete programming language.  Using 
Ethereum, anyone can write, store, and execute small computer programs via a blockchain-based 
                                                 
4 Id. 
5 Andrew Kim et al. The Stateless Currency and the State: An Examination of the Feasibility of a State 
Attack on Bitcoin (2014); Cost of a 51% Attack. https://gobitcoin.io/tools/cost-51-attack/ (estimating the 
cost of engaging in a 51% attack at over $1 billion dollars as of April 30, 2017).  
6 Vitalik Buterin.  Ethereum Whitepaper.  https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper.  
7 Bitcoin features a non-Turing complete scripting language. Using this language smart contracts can be 
created but are limited to basic arithmetic, logic and cryptographic operations (e.g. hashing and verifying 
a signature). Massimo Bartoletti and Livio Pompianu. An Empirical Analysis of Smart Contracts: 
Platforms, Applications and Design Patterns (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.06322.pdf . 
 
4 
network.8  These computer programs are executed by multiple parties on the Ethereum network 
and thus have the capability to operate autonomously and independent of the control of any 
individual party.9 
 
Smart contracts are being used to model and govern contractual relationships, structure a 
range of commercial arrangements from complex financial transactions—such as syndicated loans, 
options, and swaps—to royalty agreements involving copyrighted works.10  Currently, the use of 
smart contracts in the context of legal arrangements, falls on a spectrum.  On one end of the 
spectrum, for simple transactions, parties are relying entirely on smart contracts to model 
commercial relationships without the use of legal prose.  A smart contract and its corresponding  
data are stored on a blockchain, where computer code  governs entire commercial relationships, 
including payment obligations, asset transfers, and the terms and conditions of an arrangement.11 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, smart contracts are being used to memorialize a portion 
of a parties’ agreement, with a smart contract assisting with one or more performance obligations 
and traditional legal prose memorializing other basic contractual rights, obligations, and 
conditions—such as representations and warranties and choice of law and dispute resolution 
provisions. These “hybrid” agreements blend together traditional legal prose—written in a natural 
language like English—with smart contract programs written in code.  The written agreement 
references and incorporates a smart contract and contextualizes how the program fits into a larger 
contractual arrangement.12  
 
In many ways, legal agreements relying on smart contracts are no different than today’s 
agreements. If parties choose to rely on a smart contract for purposes of a commercial relationship, 
they must first negotiate the terms of their agreement and ideally reach a “meeting of the minds.”13 
Once an agreement is reached, parties reduce their understanding to a writing, choosing either to 
                                                 
8 With Solidity, it is theoretically possible to execute a range of complex computations using a peer-to-
peer network, creating software programs that are both hard to modify and potentially autonomous.  
Buterin, supra note 5. (“An important note is that the Ethereum virtual machine is Turing-complete; this 
means that EVM code can encode any computation that can be conceivably carried out, including infinite 
loops”); Wood, supra note 86; Hirai, Yoichi. “The Solidity Programming Language.” The Ethereum 
Wiki. https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/The-Solidity-Programming-Language.  Last edited Dec. 15, 
2016. 
9 Buterin, supra note 6. 
10 John Ream et al., Upgrading Blockchains: Smart Contract Use Cases in Industry.  Deloitte University 
Press, available at https://www2.deloitte.com/nl/nl/pages/innovatie/artikelen/blockchain-based-smart-
contract-use-cases-in-industry.html . 
11 See, e.g., Ujo Music, Imogen Heap Alpha, 
https://alpha.ujomusic.com/#/imogen_heap/tiny_human/tiny_human.; OpenBazaar, 
https://openbazaar.org/; SafeMarket, https://safemarket.github.io/.  
12 Steven Norton. Law Firm Hogan Lovells Learns to Grapple with Blockchain Contracts. WSJ.com. 
February 2, 2017. http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2017/02/01/law-firm-hogan-lovells-learns-to-grapple-with-
blockchain-contracts/.  
13 Stephen J. Choi and Gulati Mitu. Contract as Statute. 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1129 (2006) (noting that “the 
traditional model of contract interpretation focuses on the “meeting of the minds.”). 
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rely exclusively on a smart contract or draft a hybrid agreement.14 In the case of a dispute, parties 
will either renegotiate the underlying arrangement or seek redress from a court or an arbitration 
panel to revert the effects of a smart contract.15 
 
Where traditional legal agreements and agreements relying on smart contracts differ is how 
smart contracts handle performance obligations.  With contracts that only rely on natural language 
provisions, each party to the contract is responsible for performing contractual obligations and can 
choose to halt their performance at any time (and, if necessary, face the legal consequences of a 
breach).   
 
In arrangements relying on smart contracts, performance obligations are memorialized in 
code using a strict and formal programming language and executed by members of a blockchain-
based network.  For example, using Ethereum, each smart contract is assigned a blockchain-based 
address. The code of the smart contract is stored on each miner’s computer.  Parties initiate a smart 
contract by sending digitally signed “transactions” to the smart contract’s address.  The 
“transaction” is a record which includes, amongst other things, the variables necessary for the 
smart contract code to run, along with a digital signature of the sending party.  The transactional 
record is stored on the Ethereum blockchain.  Once stored, the saved record triggers the smart 
contract’s execution and the smart contract’s code is run by all miners supporting the network.   
 
In effect, once a smart contract is triggered via a transaction by one of the parties, the smart 
contract acts as the parties’ agent, deputized to assist the parties with their arrangement.  However, 
unlike traditional agents, smart contracts operate autonomously by default. Multiple parties on a 
blockchain-based network execute the smart contract code by virtue of its distributed nature, thus 
parties relying on the smart contract lack the ability to halt the smart contract’s execution unless 
provided for in the underlying code.   
 
By implication, performance obligations memorialized in a smart contract can be designed 
to be difficult to terminate. Parties can rely on a blockchain network, to gain a high degree of 
assurance that any contractual obligations memorialized using a smart contract will be 
performed.16 By relying on code that is potentially autonomous, and thus difficult to terminate or 
change, parties can reduce their need to monitor performance obligations on an ongoing basis, at 
least as compared to obligations memorialized with a traditional contract.  
 
                                                 
14 It is important to emphasize that not all contractual agreements operate in this manner. As Ian Macneil 
has noted, many contracts are not discrete and pre-negotiated, but evolve from an ongoing relationship 
between the parties. This so called “relational contracting” differs because typically there is no single 
moment at which the parties confirm a meeting of the minds. The contracting process is gradual, as 
parties gather more information about the other. See Ian R Macneil. The New Social Contract: An Inquiry 
Into Modern Contractual Relations. (1980); see also Ian R. Macneil. Contracts: Adjustment of Long-
Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law. 71 Nw. UL Rev. 
854 (1977). 
15 Of course, even if it is always possible to go through the traditional legal systems to seek redress, the 
effects of a smart contracts could, in some situations, be difficult to revert in full. For instance, in cases 
where the parties’ funds are stuck into an automated escrow.  
16 Filippi, Primavera De, and Aaron Wright. Blockchain and the Law the Rule of Code. Harvard 
University Press, 174 (2018).  
 
6 
Moreover, because smart contracts are written in computer code, they can be designed to 
be more dynamic than traditional legal prose and can be constructed to adjust performance 
obligations during the term of an agreement using a trusted third-party source—commonly referred 
to by programmers as oracles.17 Oracles can be individuals or programs that store and transmit 
information from the outside world, thereby providing a means for blockchain-based systems to 
interact with real-world persons and potentially react to external events. Oracles can be connected, 
for example, to a data feed from a third party conveying the latest London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR), or they can be sensors that transmit  temperature, humidity, or other relevant information 
about a location. More experimental, an oracle can also be made to convey the insights of human 
beings or support private dispute resolution and private arbitration systems (sometimes referred to 
as judge-as-a-Service or arbitration-as-a-Service).18  
 
Using oracles, smart contracts can respond to changing conditions in near real time. 19 
Parties to a contract can reference an oracle to modify payment flows or alter encoded rights and 
obligations according to new information. Oracles also make it possible to determine or update 
specific performance obligations based on the subjective and arbitrary judgment of individuals. In 
this way, parties can rely on the deterministic and guaranteed execution of smart contracts for 
objective promises that are readily translatable into code. At the same time, they can assign to a 
human-based oracle the task of assessing promises that cannot easily be encoded into a smart 
contract, either because they are too ambiguous or because they require a subjective assessment of 
real world events.20 
 
By virtue of the fact that smart contracts are written in code, smart contracts also have the 
potential to be more precise and could be bundled over time to form modular software libraries 
that improve the efficiency of creating and executing legal agreements. Indeed, smart contracts 
can even be tested before execution to ward off potential mishaps in the code and to confirm the 
intent of each party.21 
 
For example, consider the below smart contract, which facilitates a simple auction on the 
Ethereum blockchain. Here,  a party auctioning off an item can publicly identify an item for sale 
and find interested parties.  Those that are interested can rely on the smart contract to manage the 
sale of the item, gaining assurance that the auction process will not be rigged by the party setting 
up the sale.  
 
                                                 
17 Alec Liu. Smart Oracles: Building Business Logic With Smart Contracts. Ripple. July 16, 2014. 
https://ripple.com/insights/smart-oracles-building-business-logic-with-smart-contracts/; Vitalik Buterin. 
Ethereum and Oracles. Ethereum Blog. July 22, 2014. https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/07/22/ethereum-
and-oracles/. 
18 Michael del Castillo. Lawyers Be DAMNed: Andreas Antonopoulos Takes Aim at Arbitration With 
DAO Proposal. CoinDesk. May, 26, 2016. http://www.coindesk.com/damned-dao-andreas-antonopoulos-
third-key/. 
19 Ethan M. Katsh. Law in a Digital World (1995). 
20 Pietro Ortolani, Self-Enforcing Online Dispute Resolution: Lessons from Bitcoin. 36 Oxford J. Legal 
Studies 595 (2015). 
21 See Mintchalk, http://www.mintchalk.com. For example, a smart contract has been created which 
simulates the mechanics of a crowd funding campaign in 56 lines of code. See id. at 
http://www.mintchalk.com/c/68f3e. 
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The code follows a strict logic whereby parties interested in bidding can send a bid 
denominated in Ethereum’s native token “ether” by executing a transaction on the Ethereum 
network.  The smart contract keeps track of the highest bid.  Once the auction ends, the party 
setting up the auction can collect ether by simply sending their own signed transaction to the smart 
contract.22  Once the transaction is sent, the account of the “winning” party is debited. 
 
pragma solidity ^0.4.11; 
 
contract SimpleAuction { 
    address public beneficiary; 
    uint public auctionStart; 
    uint public biddingTime; 
 
    address public highestBidder; 
    uint public highestBid; 
 
    mapping(address => uint) pendingReturns; 
 
    bool ended; 
 
    event HighestBidIncreased(address bidder, uint amount); 
    event AuctionEnded(address winner, uint amount); 
 
    function SimpleAuction( 
        uint _biddingTime, 
        address _beneficiary 
    ) { 
        beneficiary = _beneficiary; 
        auctionStart = now; 
        biddingTime = _biddingTime; 
    } 
 
    function bid() payable { 
        require(now <= (auctionStart + biddingTime)); 
        require(msg.value > highestBid); 
        if (highestBidder != 0) { 
            pendingReturns[highestBidder] += highestBid; 
        } 
        highestBidder = msg.sender; 
        highestBid = msg.value; 
        HighestBidIncreased(msg.sender, msg.value); 
    } 
    function withdraw() returns (bool) { 
        var amount = pendingReturns[msg.sender]; 
        if (amount > 0) { 
                                                 
22 Simple Open Auction, http://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/solidity-by-example.html. 
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            pendingReturns[msg.sender] = 0; 
            if (!msg.sender.send(amount)) { 
                // No need to call throw here, just reset the amount owing 
                pendingReturns[msg.sender] = amount; 
                return false; 
            } 
        } 
        return true; 
    } 
    function auctionEnd() { 
        require(now >= (auctionStart + biddingTime)); 
        require(!ended); 
        ended = true; 
        AuctionEnded(highestBidder, highestBid); 
        beneficiary.transfer(highestBid); 
    } 
} 
 
 
Even though the mechanics of the auction follows the strict logic of the code, this smart contract—
as well as other smart contracts more generally—have limitations and drawbacks. First, if the smart 
contract contains a mistake, security flaw, or does not accurately capture the parties’ intent, the 
smart contracts will be difficult to modify or change, due to a blockchain’s resilient and tamper-
resistant nature.  If someone mistakenly overbids for an item, there will be no central party to 
petition to reverse the transaction. The program will continue to blindly execute its code, regardless 
of the intent of the parties or changed circumstances. 
 
Second, the smart contract does not entirely remove the need for trust and coordination 
between parties.  For instance, in the above example, bidders still need to affirmatively send bids 
to the smart contract by signing blockchain-based transactions.  And if the auction involves the 
sale of a physical good, the parties bidding still need to trust that the party auctioning off the good 
will deliver the product as promised.  The smart contract does not create a purely automated 
transaction.  It merely automates a narrow set of payment obligations. 
 
Third, smart contacts and blockchain technology exhibit certain security vulnerabilities, 
which could temper the desire of parties to onboard high-value commercial transactions.  
Blockchains are vulnerable to certain attacks which, if effectuated, could result in a blockchain 
splitting into two separately maintained databases (through a process called “forking”).23  In the 
event of a fork, a mal-intentioned actor could invalidate certain smart contract transactions or 
attempt to improperly transfer digital currency or other digital assets represented on a blockchain.  
The code of a smart contract is also susceptible to security vulnerabilities and exploits, which could 
                                                 
23 Castor, Amy. A Short Guide to Bitcoin Forks, http://www.coindesk.com/short-guide-bitcoin-forks-
explained/.  
Figure 1: Example Smart Contract 
 
9 
cause a smart contract to operate unexpectedly, or worse, enable a third-party to siphon digital 
currency or other assets from contracting parties accounts.24   
 
 
II. Legal Enforceability of a Smart Contract  
 
Even though the use of smart contracts in the context of legal arrangements may provide 
parties with certain advantages, the use of this code will not operate in a legal vacuum.  
Deployment of smart contracts in commercial settings will inevitably lead to disputes. For 
example, if smart contract code is flawed, incorporates a poorly drafted provision, or executes in 
a manner not intended by one of the parties, parties will likely  turn to the legal system to resolve 
the contractual dispute, thus an analysis of whether or not smart contracts can form a legally 
binding agreement is required.   
 
Given the novelty of the technology, the question of the enforceability of smart contract 
code has not yet been examined by U.S. courts.  Fortunately, the question of smart contract 
enforceability can be largely answered under existing state law implementations of the statute of 
frauds, the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”), the Electronic Signatures in Global and 
National Commerce Act (“E-Sign Act”), and state laws modeled on the Uniform Electronic 
Transactions Act (“UETA”). 
 
A. The Statute of Frauds 
 
At its most generalized level, a contract is nothing more than a “promise or set of promises 
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way 
recognizes as a duty.”25 For a contract to be binding, there must be competent parties, sufficiently 
definite terms, mutual assent and performance, and an exchange of value or another form of 
consideration.26   
 
Even though contracts may be oral or implied, every state in the U.S., except Louisiana, 
has adopted one or more statutes, known collectively as the “statute of frauds,” which identify 
agreements that are enforceable only if they are in writing and signed.27  Moreover, the U.C.C. 
also imposes writing requirements for: (i) contracts for the sale of goods priced $500 or more; (ii) 
                                                 
24 For example: After the Distributed Autonomous Organization (DAO) hack, the Ethereum blockchain 
forked into Ethereum and Ethereum Classic. Alyssa Hertig. Ethereum’s Two Ethereums Explained, 
http://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-classic-explained-blockchain/. 
25 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1. 
26 Id. § 16 (intoxication); id. §18 (both parties have made promise or started performance); id. § 20 
(mutual assent); id. § 33 (definite terms); id. § 71 (consideration). Promises might be enforceable when 
there is no consideration through promissory estoppel or the material benefit rule. Id. §§ 86, 90.  
27 Louisiana does not have a statute of frauds, but it does have writing requirements. Louisiana Code 
Article 2275 and 2462 require that contracts related to immovable property be in writing. Leases are 
exempted. Article 2241 requires that the parties both sign the document. Article 2278 requires a writing 
for promises to pay a third person’s debt. Additional writing requirements exist beyond the discussed 
articles, scattered through the Louisiana laws. M. Thomas Arceneux, Writing Requirements and the 
Authentic Act in Louisiana Law: Civil Code Articles 2236, 2275, & 2278. 35 Louisiana L. Rev. 764 
(1975).  
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agreements that create a security interest in personal property if the property is not in the secured 
party’s possession, a certificated security, or collateral that consists of deposit accounts, investment 
property, letter-of-credit rights, or electronic chattel paper if the secured party has control over 
such collateral; and (iii) lease agreements requiring total payments of more than $1,000.1  These 
statutes define the boundaries of contract enforceability and require that certain agreements be in 
writing “to protect . . . parties and preserve the integrity of contractual agreements,” guarding 
“against the peril of perjury” and “prevent[ing] the enforcement of unfounded fraudulent claims.”28   
 
1. Overview of the Statute of Frauds and U.C.C. Writing Requirements 
 
The statute of frauds generally requires that certain types of agreements be memorialized 
in writing: (i) agreements relating to executorship, suretyship, marriage29, and performance over 
one year; (ii) agreements for the transfer of an interest in land30; and (iii) agreements for the sale 
of goods over $500.31  
 
Even if certain promises are memorialized in writing, the writing will not be deemed a 
valid contract under the statute of frauds if the writing—or series of writings—do not reasonably 
identify the contracting parties, fail to outline the subject matter of the contract and its essential 
terms, and fail to contain valid signatures from the parties or their agents.32  
 
What qualifies as a valid writing under the statute of frauds is understandably flexible.  A 
writing does not need to be thorough or complete.33  The core requirement is that the writing 
contain the “material elements” of an agreement.34   A writing can be memorialized in an electronic 
format and several writings may form an agreement, provided that they may be taken together to 
                                                 
28 William J. Jenack Estate Appraisers & Auctioneers, Inc. v. Rabizadeh, 5 N.E.3d 976, 981 (2013). 
29 Agreements and promises made in consideration of marriage must be evidenced by a writing to be 
enforceable. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. § 5-701; Del. Code Ann. tit. 6 § 2714. 
30 However, “where there is a verbal agreement under which each of the parties is to convey land to the 
other, it is generally held that a conveyance by one on the faith of the agreement constitutes such part 
performance as will in equity take the case out of the operation of the statute of frauds.” In re Destro, 675 
F.2d 1037, 1038 (9th Cir. 1982). 
31 Restatement (Second) Contracts § 110; N.Y. Gen. Oblig. § 5-701; Del. Code Ann. tit. 6 § 2714.  Note 
these agreements could be enforceable even if they do not meet the requirements of the statute of frauds if 
for example, there is evidence or reliance or an implied contract. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
139. 
32 Restatement (Second) Contracts § 131 (1981); N.Y. Gen. Oblig. § 5-701; Del. Code Ann. tit. 6 § 2714. 
33 Lamle v. Mattel, Inc., 394 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“we conclude that under California law 
the . . . email satisfies the Statute of Frauds.); Levin v. Knight, 780 F.2d 786, 787 (9th Cir. 1986)  
34 Willmott v. Giarraputo, 157 N.E.2d 282, 282 (N.Y. 1959); Brown v. Cara, 420 F.3d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 
2005); Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin Nat’l Bank, 559 F.2d 863, 864 (2d Cir. 1977); Canister Co. v. 
Wood & Selick, Inc., 73 F.2d 312, 315 (3d Cir. 1934); Conner v. Lavaca Hosp. Dist., 267 F.3d 426, 430 
(5th Cir. 2001). 
 
11 
provide evidence of the validity of a contract.35  Importantly, a writing does not need to be entirely 
written in legal prose.  A writing can reference data and contain formulas.36 
 
The test for what qualifies as “essential terms” is open-ended and transaction specific. 37  
Courts generally characterize “essential terms” as those terms which are “customarily 
encountered” for a given transaction, including terms such as a purchase price, subject matter of 
the agreement, the time and term of payment, closing dates, and information sufficient to identify 
any conveyed title.38   
 
Likewise, there are no formal requirements related to what does and does not qualify as 
permissible signatures.39  A valid signature can be any symbol that a party makes with the intent 
to authenticate a record or contract,40 including a traditional ink signature, initials, a typed or 
printed signature, a signature created with a rubber stamp, and can be located at any part of a 
document.41 
 
When evaluating whether an agreement satisfies the statute of frauds, courts have long 
deployed common sense and commercial experience in assessing whether a writing is valid and 
creates an enforceable contract. In making such determinations, courts generally place weight on 
the intent of the parties and whether the signing party executed or adopted the signature with an 
intention to authenticate the writing.42   
 
For example, over a century ago, the United States Supreme Court in Bibb v. Allen, 149 
U.S. 481 (1893), grappled with the question of whether to enforce an electronically communicated 
and created agreement, finding a valid agreement involving a futures contract for cotton 
transmitted over a telegraph.43  There, the Court found a valid agreement, because the parties 
“agree[d] upon the terms in which the business should be transacted,” and intended to be bound.44  
                                                 
35 Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 110 N.E.2d 551, 552 (N.Y. 1953); Affiliated Invest., Inc. v. 
Turner, 337 So. 2d 1263, 1264 (Miss. 1976); QUINN-SHEPHERDSON CO. v. TRIUMPH FARMERS 
ELEVATOR CO., 182 N.W. 710, 710 (Minn. 1921); Johnson & Miller v. Buck, 35 N.J.L. 338, 340 
(1872); Casazza v. Kiser, 313 F.3d 414, 419 (8th Cir. 2002). 
36 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 62 S. Ct. 581 (1942); Tractebel Energy Mktg. v. AEP Power 
Mktg., 487 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007); Doyle v. Wohlrabe, 66 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Minn. 1954). 
37 Lamle, 394 F.3d at 1361 (What is an essential term “depends on the agreement and its context and also 
on the subsequent conduct of the parties.”). 
38 Nesbitt v. Penalver, 835 N.Y.S.2d 426, 429 (2d Dep’t 2007); Levin v. Knight, 780 F.2d 786, 787 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (the Ninth Circuit, interpreting California law, has stated that “the subject matter, the price, and 
the party against whom enforcement is sought” are the “few terms deemed essential as a matter of law by 
California courts.”); Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Until it is 
reasonable to conclude . . . that all of the points that the parties themselves regard as essential have been 
expressly or . . . implicitly resolved, the parties have not … formed a contract.”);  
39 U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt 37. 
40 Restatement (Second) Contracts § 134; U.C.C. § 1-201(39). 
41 Id. § 134; Flight Sys. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 112 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir 1997); Hessenthaler v. 
Farzin, 564 A.2d 990 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1989). 
42 U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt 37. 
43 Bibb v. Allen, 149 U.S. 481 (1893). 
44 Id. 
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The fact that key terms of the relevant agreement were memorialized using The Shepperson Cotton 
Code, a popular encrypted telegraphic code at the turn of the twentieth century used for the cotton 
trade made little difference, because the parties contemplated using the code to engage in 
commercial activity. 
 
At the same time, however, courts have voided agreements where signatures were deemed 
to be automatic and not indicative of a parties’ intent.  By way of illustration, in Parma Tile Mosaic 
& Marble Co., Inc. v. Estate of Short, 87 N.Y.2d 524 (N.Y. 1996), the New York Court of Appeals 
held that an automatic fax machine heading printed on a document did not satisfy the statute of 
frauds signature requirement. The court held that under the statute of frauds, a valid signature 
requires an intentional act to authenticate the writing. Where the name or signature is automatically 
generated without regard to the underlying document, the statute of frauds is not satisfied and the 
contract is not enforceable.45 
  
Agreements covered by the U.C.C. have comparable, but slightly different writing 
requirements.  For contracts over $500 involving the sale of goods, the writing must indicate, at a 
minimum, that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and reasonably identify the 
subject matter of the agreement.46 The writing must also show the price as a “defined or stated 
price.”47  If there is no writing, an agreement will still be enforceable if “payment has been made 
and accepted” by the purchasing party.48 
 
For contracts involving lease agreements with total payments over $1,000, the writing must 
sufficiently indicate that a lease contract has been made and detail the total payments under the 
lease, the lease term, and describe the goods leased.49  Like with the sale of goods over $500, a  
lease will still be deemed enforceable with respect to goods that have been received and accepted 
by the lessee.50 
 
                                                 
45 87 N.Y.2d 524 (N.Y. 1996). 
46 U.C.C. § 1-206. 
47 Id. § 2-201.  A contract for the sale of goods will also be valid, even if it is not in writing, if: (i) “the 
goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary 
course of the seller’s business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under 
circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial 
beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement”; or (ii) “the party against whom 
enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was 
made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted.”  Id. 
48 Id. § 2A-201.  A lease agreement also will be valid, even if it is not in writing if: (i) “if the goods are to 
be specially manufactured or obtained for the lessee and are not suitable for lease or sale to others in the 
ordinary course of the lessor’s business, and the lessor, before notice of repudiation is received and under 
circumstances that reasonably indicate that the goods are for the lessee, has made either a substantial 
beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement”; or “the party against whom 
enforcement is sought admits in that party’s pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a lease contract 
was made, but the lease contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods 
admitted.  Id. 
49 Id. § 2A-201. 
50 Id. 
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Contracts that only involve a security interest will be “enforceable against the debtor and 
third parties with respect to collateral if the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that 
provides a description of the collateral and, if the security interest covers timber to be cut, a 
description of the land concerned”51 In general, contracts for the “sale or purchase of a security 
[are] enforceable whether or not there is a writing signed or record authenticated,” so long as “value 
has been given” and the debtor has “rights in the collateral.”52 
 
The U.C.C. also has flexible signature requirements.  Both contracts for the sale of goods 
and lease agreements require that the writing be signed, “using any symbol executed or adopted 
with present intention to adopt or accept a writing.”53  The U.C.C. does not provide a “catalog of 
possible [signing] situation[s],”54 leaving it to courts to apply “common sense and commercial 
experience” to determine whether “the symbol was executed or adopted by the party with present 
intention to adopt or accept the writing.”55 Contracts involving a security interest, simply require 
that the relevant writing be “authenticated” by “signing” the document “with present intent to 
adopt or accept a record, to attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic sound, 
symbol or process.”56 
 
2. Use of Smart Contracts in Legal Agreements under the Statute of Frauds 
 
The use of smart contracts to govern a contractual arrangement should satisfy the statute 
of frauds. To create an enforceable agreement, contracting parties must manifest an intent to be 
bound and satisfy basic requirements for contract formation, including reasonably identifying the 
parties and outlining material terms of an arrangement. The agreement must be accompanied by 
valid signatures which are not automatically generated. 
 
Accordingly, the code of a smart contract and any data stored in a transaction used to trigger 
a smart contract can—in certain instances—represent the essential terms and conditions of an 
agreement.57 A smart contract can be written to facilitate payment—including at set time-
periods—and can transfer title to property represented on a blockchain.  Parties seeking to use a 
smart contract can enter into a transaction that initiates the smart contract code’s execution, and 
the record related to the transaction can contain relevant information about a parties’ agreement.  
Thus, the initiating transaction and the smart contract code, when viewed together, can 
memorialize the material terms of certain agreements.58   
                                                 
51 Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(A). If the “collateral is not a certificated security and is in possession of the secured 
party” or “the collateral is a certificated security in registered form and the security certificate has been 
delivered to the secured party,” or “the collateral is deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment 
property, letter-of-credit right, or electronic documents and the secured party has control” then it is 
unnecessary for the debtor to “authenticat[e] [the] security agreement.”  Id. § 9-2039(b).    
52 Id. § 8-113(a); An exception to inapplicability of the statute of frauds to securities exists for “contracts 
for the sale or purchase of a cooperative interest.” Id. § 8-113(b) 
53 Id. § 1-201(37). 
54 Id.§ 1-201 cmt. 37. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. § 9-102(7). 
57 Restatement (Second) Contracts § 131 (1981); N.Y. Gen. Oblig. § 5-701; Del. Code Ann. tit. 6 § 2714. 
58 For example, the subject matter of the agreement could be delineated in the comments of the smart 
contract code. 
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Indeed, even if a smart contract relies on outside data feeds or oracles, the above analysis 
should not change.  Courts have routinely held that formulas—even indefinite ones—can be 
sufficient for fulfilling the price terms of contracts so long as the parties agree to rely on the 
formula and agree to reference an outside data source.59   
 
Blockchain-based transactional records and the digital signatures associated with these 
records should also satisfy the statute of fraud’s writing requirements.  As noted above, the test for 
what qualifies as a valid signature is flexible and can include “[a]ny mark affixed to a writing with 
the intent to authenticate” the contract.60  Typewritten signatures and electronic records stored by 
computing devices have been found sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds. 
Thus  transactional records and associated digital signatures stored in a blockchain should also be 
deemed sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. 
 
For instance in Lamle v. Mattel, 394 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Federal Circuit 
determined that an email and an accompanying typewritten name could satisfy the statute of frauds, 
because courts have held that “typed names appearing on the end of telegrams are sufficient to be 
writings under the Statute of Frauds” because there is “no meaningful difference between a 
typewritten signature on a telegram and an email.”61 
 
 For much the same reason, there is no meaningful difference between a typewritten name 
and a digital signature affixed to a transaction triggering a smart contract using public private key 
cryptography, assuming the address can be uniquely tied to the signing party.  The purpose of the 
“statute of frauds is to prevent a contracting party from creating a triable issue concerning the 
terms of the contract—or for that matter concerning whether a contract even exists—on the basis” 
of one party’s word.62  It is for that reason that neither the common law nor the U.C.C. requires a 
handwritten signature.63 
 
Similar reasoning should apply to public-private key cryptography where there is verifiable 
evidence “and not merely say-so evidence” establishing an intent by a party to be bound to a 
contractual arrangement.64  A digital signature associated with a blockchain-based transaction 
requires a volitional act on the part of the signing party—the inputting of a private key—and thus 
should satisfy the statute of frauds. 
                                                 
59 Citadel Grp. v. Wash. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 692 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 2012); Arbitron, Inc. v. Tralyn 
Broad., Inc., 400 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2005); Piven v. Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz L.L.P., 
2010 WL 1257326, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2010); Cobble Hill Nursing Home, Inc. v. Henry & Warren 
Corp., 74 N.Y.2d 475, 483 (1989). 
60 4 Williston, Contracts § 585 (3rd ed. 1961). 
61 394 F.3d at 1362; see also Mirchel v. RMJ Sec. Corp., 613 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878 (1st Dep’t 1994) 
(“documentary evidence in defendant’s own files . . . and defendant’s computer records . . . satisfy any 
writing requirement under the Statute of Frauds.”). 
62 Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d 289, 296 (7th Cir. 2002).  
63 Id.; Just Pants v. Wagner, 617 N.E.2d 246, 251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking 
Corp., supra, 931 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir. 1991); Hillstrom v. Gosnay, 614 P.2d 466, 469 (Mont. 1980); 
810 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1-201 cmt. 37; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 134, cmt. a (1981). 
64 Cloud Corp., 313 F.3d at 296; see also Consolidation Services, Inc. v. KeyBank National Ass’n, 185 
F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir.1999); Monetti, S.P.A., 931 F.2d at 1183. 
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If a smart contract is incorporated by reference into a standard legal agreement, the risk 
that the agreement would fail to satisfy the statute of frauds lessens.  Such an agreement could 
readily satisfy the statute of frauds writing requirement and could outline the material terms of a 
parties’ arrangement.  Signatures could be typewritten, or signed by hand, and the smart contract 
code could be made a material part of the arrangement. 
 
Indeed, contracting parties have long relied on comparable “hybrid” agreements in 
arrangements involving the exchange of other electronic information. Since the late 1970s, 
contracting parties—particularly large corporations—have relied on electronic data interchange 
(“EDI”) systems to swap electronic purchase orders, invoices, bills of lading, inventory data, and 
various types of confirmations to manage their ongoing commercial relationships, eliminating 
paperwork and reducing labor and transaction costs.”65  
 
With EDI arrangements, parties often execute master agreements that contextualize the use 
of electronic messaging in the context of a broader contractual relationship.66 They sign traditional 
paper agreements governing the exchange of messages between themselves and rely on EDI 
systems to manage an ongoing trading partnership.67   
 
These master agreements generally confirm, inter alia, that the parties will “electronically 
transmit to or receive from the other party any of the transactions” via EDI systems.  The parties 
further: (i) affirm their “mutual intent . . .to create binding purchase and sale obligations pursuant 
to . . . electronic transmission[s]”; (ii) acknowledge that electronic messages and transmissions 
will be considered a “writing” or “in writing”; and (iii) establish that the use of electronic messages 
will “evidence a course of dealing and course of performance accepted by the parties.” To further 
gird against an enforceability challenge, parties warrant “not to contest the enforceability” of the 
agreement.68 
 
A similar structure could be adopted for arrangements involving smart contracts. A master 
agreement could address potential enforceability issues raised by a smart contract and provided 
additional context as to the subject matter and intent of the parties should a dispute arise in the 
future.  Parties could confirm that a smart contract is being used to govern key performance 
obligations and the master agreement could outline terms, conditions, and other contractual 
provisions that will not be readily translatable into code—provisions such as representations and 
warranties, dispute resolution provisions, and other standard boilerplate clauses. 
 
                                                 
65  Wittie, Robert A., and Jane K. Winn. Electronic Records and Signatures under the Federal E-SIGN 
Legislation and the UETA. 55 The Business Lawyer 293 (2000). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 The Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange-A 
Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 Bus. Law. 1645, 1746 (1990). 
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3. Use of Smart Contracts for Legal Agreements Covered by U.C.C. Statute 
of Frauds Requirements. 
 
A smart contract—in and of itself—can also create an enforceable agreement involving the 
sale of goods over $500.  Under Article 2 of the U.C.C., a contract for the sale of goods will only 
be deemed enforceable if: (i) there is a writing that indicates that a contract for sale has been made; 
and (ii) the writing is signed by the party against whom enforcement of the contract is sought.69  
 
A smart contract and the blockchain-based transaction triggering the smart contract should 
both qualify as valid “writings.”  Under the U.C.C, a “writing” is broadly defined to cover any 
“printing, typewriting or any other intentional reduction to tangible form,”70 and electronic records, 
like e-mail, have been found to satisfy the U.C.C.’s writing requirements.  Because a smart contract 
and the related transactional information can be fairly construed as electronic records, a smart 
contracts and the blockchain-based transactions triggering the smart contracts should both should 
satisfy the U.C.C.’s writing requirements.71  
 
A digital signature related to a blockchain-based transaction should also qualify as a valid 
signature.  As noted above, the U.C.C. does not define the manner in which a signature needs to 
be represented, and courts analyze whether there is a valid signature by assessing whether there is 
evidence that the parties “adopted or accepted” the writing. 72  A seller or purchaser of a good 
relying on a smart contract could effectively indicate their assent to an agreement when they input 
their private key to send the blockchain-based transaction. 
 
Data stored in a transactional record used to initiate a smart contract—when viewed in 
conjunction with a smart contract’s code—can further indicate that a contract for sale has been 
made.  The transactional record can contain relevant payment terms and include a reference to a 
good which is represented or tracked on a blockchain—i.e., the relevant good could be 
“tokenized.” 73  
 
Smart contracts concerning leases over $1,000 can also be constructed to comply with the 
requirements of the U.C.C. Unless an exception applies, to meet Article 2A’s statute of frauds, a 
writing concerning a lease must detail the total payments under the lease, the lease term, and 
describe the goods leased.74  An exact or precise description of the leased goods or the term of the 
                                                 
69 U.C.C. § 2-201. 
70 Id. § 1-201(43). 
71 Bazak Int’l Corp. v. Tarrant Apparel Grp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 377, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also 
International Casings Group, Inc. v. Premium Standard Farms, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 863, 872-875 (W.D. 
Mo. 2005); Roger Edwards, LLC v. Fiddes & Son, LTD, 245 F. Supp. 2d 251, 257-261 (D. Me. 2003); 
Central Illinois Light Company v. Consolidated Coal Company, 235 F. Supp. 2d 916, 919 (C.D. Ill. 
2002); Commonwealth Aluminum Corporation v. Stanley Metal Associates, 186 F. Supp. 2d 770, 772-
774 (W.D. Ky. 2001). 
72 Id. 
73 For more information about “tokens,” see Linda Xie. “A Beginners Guide to Ethereum Tokens.”  The 
Coinbase Blog.  May 22, 2017. https://blog.coinbase.com/a-beginners-guide-to-ethereum-tokens-
fbd5611fe30b.  
74 U.C.C. § 2A-201. 
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lease is not required. All that is necessary is that the writing “reasonably identifies” the agreement’s 
subject matter.75   
 
As with the sale of goods, a tokenized reference to property could be stored in a 
transactional record used to trigger a smart contract’s code, along with the relevant term and 
payment obligations.  The key provisions of a lease could thus be discerned by viewing the 
triggering transaction and the smart contract code. 
 
However, a smart contact may not be able to fully satisfy U.C.C. writing requirements for 
transactions that create a security interest in personal property.  While any property subject to a 
security interest could theoretically be represented on a blockchain—thereby describing relevant 
collateral—a smart contract could theoretically fail to contain a clear statement that a debtor is 
providing a security interest in relevant goods.  
 
To address these limitations, and to limit any of the risks of non-enforceability under the 
U.C.C., contracting parties could craft a “hybrid agreement” that incorporate any necessary 
language found in a standard security agreement.  As with the hybrid agreement described above, 
an agreement written in legal prose could contain representations and warranties, debtor covenants, 
and other assurances, and incorporate by reference a smart contract to handle lending and re-
payment terms. 
 
B. The ESIGN Act, UETA, and Related State Statutes 
 
Further reducing the opportunity to challenge the enforceability of a legal agreement 
relying all or in part on smart contracts are the E-Sign Act, UETA, and similar state law variations. 
Generally, these acts—when applicable—establish that signatures, contracts, and other records 
cannot be denied legal effect solely because they are in electronic form. 
 
1. Requirements of the UETA 
 
Since 1999, 47 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have 
adopted the UETA.  The UETA gives electronic records and electronic signatures the same legal 
effect as traditional, written documents and signatures in certain transactions. So long as each party 
to a contract has agreed to conduct the transaction electronically, under Section 7 of the UETA, an 
electronic record and electronic signature may not be denied legal effect or deemed unenforceable 
simply because either was in electronic form.76 If a law requires a record to be in writing, or 
requires a signature, electronic versions will be deemed sufficient.77   
 
The definitions in the UETA are broad and cover a range of electronic signatures and 
records. An “electronic record” includes any “record created, generated, sent, communicated, 
received, or stored by electronic means,”78 including any “[i]nformation processing systems, 
computer equipment and programs” as well as any “information stored on a computer hard 
                                                 
75 Anderson U.C.C. § 2A-201:33 (3d. ed.) 
76 UETA § 7(a), (c)-(d). 
77 Id. § 7 (c). 
78 Id. § 2 (7). 
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drive.”79 An “electronic signature” comprises any “electronic sound, symbol, or process attached 
to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign 
the record,”80 and covers any “digital signature using public key encryption technology.”81  
 
 As with traditional written signatures, when determining if an electronic signature creates 
an enforceable contract, courts assess whether the signer executed or adopted the signature with 
the intent to sign the record.  The signature must be accompanied by an “intent to do a legally 
significant act.”82 
 
Importantly, UETA contemplates the use of computer programs—what the UETA terms 
an “electronic agent”—and other automated means of entering into binding agreements, stipulating 
that an agreement will not be denied legal effect simply because parties chose to use an “electronic 
agent” when engaging in commercial activity.   
 
Under the UETA, an “electronic agent” broadly includes any “computer program” and 
other “automated means used to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or performances 
in whole or in part, without review or action by an individual.”83 Electronic agents can “initiat[e], 
respond[e] or interact with other parties or their electronic agents” and may be “created with the 
ability to act autonomously, and not just automatically.”84  Contracts facilitated by electronic 
agents may be formed “even if no individual was aware of or reviewed the electronic agents’ 
actions or the resulting terms and agreements” and even contemplates “anonymous click-
transactions,” where a party engages in a transaction without providing identification.85  
 
Despite the UETA’s expansive nature, there are certain transactions specifically excluded 
from UETA.  These state statutes only apply to “transactions related to business, commercial 
(including consumer) and governmental matters” and thus do not apply to transactions governed 
by: (i) laws relating to the creation and execution of wills, codicils, or testamentary trusts; (ii) 
contracts governed by the UCC, other than sections covering: (A) the waiver or renunciation of a 
claim or right after a breach of contract; (B) the sale of goods; (C) leases; or (D) any other specific 
law identified as exempt in a state’s adopted version of the UETA.86 
 
These exceptions are narrow.  The UETA covers, in toto, transactions under U.C.C. Article 
2 and 2A, as well as trusts in commercial and business settings.87  If desired by the parties, the 
                                                 
79 Id. § 2, cmt. 6. 
80 Id. § 1. 
81 Id. § 1, cmt. 7. 
82 Id. § 2, cmt. 7. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. § 2, cmt. 5. 
85 Id. § 12, cmt 2. 
86 Id. § 3, cmt 1. UCC § 1-306, former section 1-107; UCC § 1-306, former section 1-107; UCC §§ 2A-
101-2A-532; UETA § 3(b).  The UETA also does not apply to transactions governed by the Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act, which has only been adopted in Maryland and Virginia. Md. 
Code Ann., Com. Law § 22. Maryland Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act; Va. Code Ann. 
§ 59.1, Chpt. 43. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act.  
87 UETA § 3, cmt 1 
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UETA even applies transactions involving real estate,88 in an attempt to break down “existing 
barriers to electronic contracting”.89  However, because real estate transactions generally require 
filing with governmental offices to finalize a sale, the UETA leaves it up to the states to determine 
whether to “adopt an electronic filing system” or otherwise require additional “paper filing[s].”90 
 
2. Related State Law Electronic Signature and Records Statutes 
 
Three states (New York, Illinois, and Washington) have not adopted the UETA, choosing 
instead to implement their own unique statutes relating to electronic transactions. New York has 
enacted the Electronic Signatures and Records Act (“ESRA”), which recognizes that an electronic 
signature has the same validity and effect as a handwritten signature.91 Like the UETA, the ESRA 
applies only to certain transactions and generally does not apply to transactions that involve: (i) 
laws relating to wills, trusts, powers of attorney, or health care proxies; (ii) negotiable instruments 
and other instruments of title where possession of the instrument confers title; and (iii) any other 
document that the New York State Office for Technology has specifically identified.92  The ESRA 
adopts the UETA’s definition of an electronic signature and provides that “[a]n electronic record 
shall have the same force and effect as those records not produced by electronic means.”93  
Additionally, the ESRA states that an “electronic record” includes any “information, evidencing 
any act, transaction, occurrence, event, or other activity, produced or stored by electronic means 
and capable of being accurately reproduced in forms perceptible by human sensory capabilities.”94 
 
In much the same way as New York, Illinois also recognizes the legal effect and validity 
of electronic records and signatures under the Electronic Commerce Security Act (“ECSA”).95 
Under the ECSA, an electronic signature is a signature that is both in electronic form and attached 
to, or logically associated with an electronic record.96  As with UETA and ESRA, the ECSA 
generally does not apply to transactions that involve: (i) laws governing wills, trusts, powers of 
attorney, or health care proxies; (ii) negotiable instruments and other instruments of title where 
possession of the instrument confers title.97  
 
Washington further recognizes that a digital signature satisfies the legal requirements for a 
signature under the Washington Electronic Authentication Act (“EAA”).98 Under the EAA, a 
digital signature is a process used to attach a unique digital code to an electronic message. The 
signer uses a private key, a code used to encrypt or decrypt a message, to sign the electronic record. 
                                                 
88 Id. § 3, cmt 3. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 N.Y. State Tech. § 304. 
92 Id. § 307. 
93 Id. § 302. 
94 Id. 
95 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 175/5-110. 
96 Id. 175/5-105. 
97 Id. 175/5-115(b). 
98 Wash. Rev. Code § 19.34.300(1). 
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The recipient of the electronic record can then use the signer’s public key to verify whether the 
digital signature is valid, or the message has been altered since it was signed.99 
 
However, neither the ESRA, ECRA, nor the EEA expressly provide for, or address, the 
automatic execution of an agreement via an electronic agent.  These three statutes do not directly 
address the creation of electronic contracts via automated means. 
 
3. The E-Sign Act 
 
To harmonize the fractured approach taken by U.S. states, in 2000, Congress passed the E-
Sign Act.  Like the UETA, the E-Sign Act broadly states that electronic signatures and contracts 
maintained as electronic records—which are involved in “any transaction in or affecting interstate 
or foreign commerce”—cannot be denied enforceability or legal effect simply because they were 
conducted through electronic means.100 Under E-SIGN, an electronic signature includes any 
“electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other 
record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.”101 And an 
“electronic record” covers any record “created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored 
by electronic means.”102 
 
The E-Sign Act also contemplates the use of “electronic agents” by parties, defining the 
term to include any “computer program” or other “automated means used independently to initiate 
an action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in part, without review or 
action by an individual.”103  If parties use an “electronic agent,” a contract may not be denied legal 
effect “so long as the action of any such electronic agent is legally attributable to the person to be 
bound.”104  
 
  Except under limited circumstances, the E-Sign Act preempts state laws governing written 
contracts that affect interstate or foreign commerce.105 However, the E-Sign Act contains an 
“exemption to preemption” section, which provides that state law may “modify, limit, or  
supersede”106 the E-Sign Act if a state has either adopted the UETA, or has specified “alternative 
procedures or requirements”107 that satisfy its particular requirements. Such procedures or 
requirements may not, according to the Act, expand the legal status or effect of the specific 
technology associated with “storing, generating, receiving, communicating, or authenticating 
electronic records or electronic signatures.”108  
 
                                                 
99 Id. § 19.34.020(11). 
100 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a). 
101 Id. § 7006(5). 
102 Hamdi Halal Market LLC v. United States, 947 F. Supp. 2d 159, 164 (D. Mass. 2013). 
103 15 U.S.C. § 7006. 
104 Id. § 7001(h). 
105 Id. § 7002. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. § 7002(a)(2)(A). 
108 Id. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
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Even though the E-Sign Act employs similar language and provisions as UETA, the E-
Sign Act provides for stronger consumer protections.  Under the E-Sign Act, electronic records 
may be used to satisfy any law that requires that records be provided to consumers “in writing” 
only if the consumer has affirmatively consented to the use of the electronic records, and has not 
withdrawn consent (the “E-Sign Consumer Consent Process”).109  In such circumstances, the 
electronic record provider must deliver a clear and conspicuous statement of certain information 
(collectively, the “E-Sign Consumer Consent Disclosures”).110 Moreover, the consumer must 
consent electronically or provide consent electronically, in a manner that “reasonably 
demonstrates” that the consumer can access information in the electronic format that will be used 
to provide the information.111  
 
Thus, any in-person transaction which concludes in a paper agreement to engage in 
business electronically should be followed up by an electronic confirmation and consent—which 
must occur before any information that is required to be provided “in writing” is delivered. What 
satisfies the requirement is subject to interpretation: One view is that the reasonable demonstration 
test is flexible and can be satisfied by a consumer’s e-mail confirming that the consumer can access 
the electronic records or a consumer’s acknowledgment or affirmative response to a provider’s 
query asking if the consumer has the necessary hardware and software.112 However, the more 
conservative view is that the consumer must demonstrate that they can access the information 
through an actual test using the electronic format in which the information will be delivered.113 
 
4. Analysis Under UETA, E-Sign, and Related State Statutes 
 
Under the UETA, E-Sign Act, and related state statutes, legal agreements relying on a smart 
contract would likely withstand a challenge on the grounds of enforceability.  Under these statutes, 
a blockchain should qualify as an “electronic record,” due to the fact that a blockchain can be used, 
in part, as a record keeping system and is generated, sent, communicated, received, and stored via 
electronic means.  The UETA has been interpreted to include databases,114 the closest analogy to 
a blockchain. 
 
The use of a private key to sign a transaction involving a smart contract also should readily 
qualify as an electronic signature.  As with our analysis above, none of the aforementioned statutes 
strictly define what qualifies as a valid signature.  Due to these statutes broad definitions, numeric 
                                                 
109 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1). Several states have incorporated the requirements of the E-Sign Consumer 
Consent Process into their adoption of UETA. See, for example, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:12-21. 
110 Id. A “consumer” is, for purposes of the E-Sign Act, “an individual who obtains, through a transaction, 
products or services which are used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and also means 
the legal representative of such an individual.” Id. 
111 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1)(C). 
112 146 Cong. Rec. S5282 (daily ed. June 16, 2000). 
113 46 Cong. Rec. S5215, S5216 (daily ed., June 15, 2000). 
114 Godfrey v. Fred Meyer Stores, 202 Or. App. 673, 692, 124 P.3d 621, 631 (2005) (noting that “entering 
. . . [a] statement into an electronic database seems to be an action of a different quality than physically 
taking pen to paper to record the statement. However, it is a distinction without a difference” under the 
UETA); 
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codes or public-private key combinations should serve as an “electronic signature” and be deemed 
sufficient to establish the identity of parties relying on a smart contract.115 
 
Moreover, under the UETA and E-Sign Act, a smart contract would fit neatly into both 
statute’s definitions of an “electronic agent.”  A smart contract can be reasonably construed as an 
automated means to “initiate an action or respond to . . . performances in whole or in part, without 
review or action by an individual.”116 As such, even if the smart contract effectuated performance 
obligations without the express review of contracting parties, the agreement would still be deemed 
enforceable.  
 
Yet, there are several hurdles when squaring smart contracts within existing U.S. e-
signature statutes.  First, the E-Sign Act and UETA emphasize the need for clear, voluntary consent 
between parties to use electronic records and signatures before conducting a transaction 
electronically.  Although an express agreement is not strictly required—especially in business-to-
business transactions—and an agreement may be implied or determined from relevant facts and 
circumstances, a standard contract written in legal prose could readily manifest parties’ intent to 
use smart contracts to govern their transaction and would limit potential ambiguity and the risk of 
an enforceability challenge. 
 
Second, for consumer transactions involving smart contracts which implicate the E-Sign 
Consumer Consent Process, such transactions would need to be wrapped in a system capable of 
providing necessary disclosures to consumers.  Such a system would need to clearly and 
conspicuously generate a notice of the consumers’ right to receive required consumer information 
in writing, an explanation of the scope of each consumer’s affirmative consent, and describe what 
types of transactions the consent applies to.  If applicable, such a system would also have to include 
a statement affirming that the consumer’s consent covers the general use of electronic records and 
electronic signatures in connection with a transaction. 
 
Third, because New York, Illinois, and Washington do not expressly recognize that 
contracts can be formed via an “electronic agent,” there is a question as to whether an automated 
technical system—like a smart contract—will be covered by each state’s respective electronic 
signature statutes.  Contracting parties in these three states could argue that New York, Illinois, 
and Washington law is governed by the E-Sign Act when it comes to the use of “electronic agents,” 
but the failure of the state statutes to address the use of “electronic agents” creates some ambiguity 
in these three states.117 
 
III. Recent State Law Amendments Relating to Blockchain Technology and the Need 
for Additional Legislation 
                                                 
115 See Stephanie Curry, Washington’s Electronic Signature Act: An Anachronism in the New 
Millennium, 88 Wash. L. Rev. 559, 569 (2013). 
116 UETA §2(6); 15 U.S.C. § 7006(3). 
117 Id. § 7002 (explaining that a “State statute, regulation, or other rule” may only “modify, limit, or 
supercede” the E-Sign Act if the state “specifies the alternative procedures or requirements for the use or 
acceptance (or both) of electronic records or electronic signatures to establish the legal effect, validity, or 
enforceability of contracts or other records” and “such alternative procedures or requirements are 
consistent with the [E-Sign Act].” 
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Despite the fact that the statute of frauds, U.C.C., UETA, and E-Sign Act likely would 
accommodate the use of smart contracts in a range of transactions, over the past several years, 
multiple states have begun to pass laws aimed at clarifying the enforceability of smart contracts in 
the context of legal agreements, presumably in an attempt to attract potential entrepreneurs 
developing applications and services relying on blockchain technology. As of October 2018, five 
states—Arizona, California, Nevada, Tennessee, and Ohio—have amended the UETA specifically 
to make records maintained on a blockchain, “electronic records” within the meaning of the 
UETA.118 
 
 For instance, in March 2017, Arizona amended its implementation of the UETA—the 
Arizona Electronic Transactions Act (“AETA”)—to expressly include blockchain technology in 
the definition of “electronic records” and “electronic signatures.”  Specifically, the AETA now 
provides that “[a] signature that is secured through blockchain is . . . an electronic signature,”119 
and “[a] record or contract is secured through blockchain is . . . an electronic record.”120 The AETA 
also affirmatively states that “[a] contract . . . may not be denied . . . enforceability solely because 
that contract contains a smart contract term.”121   
 
In much the same way, Nevada has expanded the Nevada Electronic Transactions Act 
(“NETA”) to clarify that an “electronic record” includes, “without limitation, a blockchain,”122 
while not otherwise affecting the state’s implementation of the UETA.  
 
Similar to the Nevada amendment, Ohio has expanded its definition of “electronic record” 
and “electronic signature” under the UETA to allow for transactions recorded by blockchain 
technology. Specifically, the amendment states that “a record or contract that is secured through 
blockchain technology is considered to be in an electronic form and to be an electronic record.”  It 
also provides that, “[a] signature that is secured through blockchain technology is considered to be 
in an electronic form and to be an electronic signature.” However, these amendments are a 
truncated version of the originally proposed statute, which included (i) a definition of “blockchain 
technology”, (ii) a definition of “smart contracts”. As proposed, both definitions mirrored that of 
the Arizona statute.123 
 
Further, Tennessee has amended its UETA to provide that (a) “[a] cryptographic signature 
that is generated and stored through distributed ledger technology is considered to be in an 
electronic form and to be an electronic signature.” and (b) “[a] record or contract that is secured 
                                                 
118 2017 Ariz. HB 2417 44-7061; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 719.090; 2018 Tenn. SB 1662 47-10-202; 2018 
Ohio. SB 220 1306.01. Of the three states which have not adopted the UETA—Illinois and New York—
have both proposed laws that define blockchain in connection with electronic records and signatures. 
2018 Ill. HB5553; 2018 N.Y. SB 8858. 
119 2017 Ariz. HB 2417 44-7061. 
120 Id. 
121 2017 Ariz. HB 2417 44-7061. 
122 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 719.090. 
123 2018 Ohio. SB 300 1306.01 
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through distributed ledger technology is considered to be in an electronic form and to be an 
electronic record.”124  
 
California also has sought to accommodate blockchain technology, but did not add new 
language to amend the UETA, rather, it clarified in the context of its legislative counsel’s digest 
on blockchain technology, that the existing law provides that an electronic record or signature 
satisfies the law if a record is required to be in writing.125 
 
As outlined in the previous section, the broad definitions of “electronic records” and 
“electronic agent” contained in the UETA and E-Sign Act should accommodate the use of smart 
contracts to create enforceable legal agreements.  Thus, the amendments enacted by these various 
states, are largely unnecessary and may needlessly complicate the enforceability of smart contracts 
by creating ambiguities within the law.  
 
For example, in the case of Arizona, newly enacted definitions of “blockchain” and “smart 
contract” may prove problematic if, and when, a legal agreement relying on a smart contract is 
interpreted by a court, due to the definition’s use of potentially ambiguous terms and terms which 
may not apply to emerging blockchain technology.  These amendments define a “blockchain” as 
a “distributed ledger technology that uses a distributed, decentralized, shared and replicated ledger, 
which may be public or private, permissioned or permissionless, or driven by tokenized crypto 
economics or tokenless. The data on the ledger is protected with cryptography, is immutable and 
auditable and provides an uncensored truth.”126 Similarly, the California definition of “blockchain” 
while temporary, is defined as “mathematically secured, chronological, and decentralized ledger 
or database.”127  
 
These definitions contain specialized and ambiguous terms such as “distributed ledger 
technology,” “crypto economics,” “decentralized ledger,” and “tokenless” to describe a 
blockchain—terms which currently lack a plain and ordinary meaning. For example, the California 
definition uses the term “decentralized ledger,”—an ambiguous term which has yet to be defined 
and will likely require significant expertise and litigation in order to carefully quantify a minimum 
standard of “decentralization.” Moreover, the Arizona definition defines a blockchain as an 
“immutable” ledger, capable of providing “uncensored truth,” even though blockchains can be 
modified and changed, in limited instances, and thus do not strictly fall within the ambit of 
Arizona’s definition.128   
 
The definition of “smart contract” exhibits similar problems.  The phrase is defined in 
Arizona and Tennessee as an “event-driven program” that “runs” on a “distributed, decentralized, 
                                                 
124 2018 Tenn. SB 1662 47-10-202 
125 2018 Cal. AB 2658.  
126 2017 Ariz. HB 2417 44-7061. 
127 2018 Cal. AB 2658. 
128 For example, Merriam Webster defines the term “immutable” as “not capable of or susceptible to 
change.” Immutability, Merriam Webster (Online), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/immutable.  The American Heritage dictionary largely follows this definition, 
defining the term as “[n]ot subject or susceptible to change.” Immutability, American Heritage (Online), 
https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=immutability.   
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shared, and replicated ledger” and can “take custody over . . .  assets.”129  A plain and ordinary 
interpretation of this definition would not cover a smart contract relying on a blockchain, because 
the term “ledger” is generally ascribed to “[a] book or series of books used for recording financial 
transactions in the form of debits and credits”130 and not computing technology.  Moreover, in 
current implementations of blockchain technology, smart contracts are not “run” on a blockchain.  
Rather, as noted above, they are “run” by miners or other validators of a blockchain-based network. 
 
Because these state’s statutes contain a number of potentially ambiguous and undefined 
terms, courts would need to construe these definitions with reference to the intent of the legislature, 
generating questions about the amendment’s breadth and application. 131  At worst, a court may 
deem existing or future architectures for blockchains or implementations of smart contract 
technology to fall outside these definitions, thus limiting the scope of their respective legislation.132 
 
Adding further complication, by amending state UETA legislation to broadly define 
blockchain-based records as “electronic signatures,” as Arizona and Tennessee have, states may 
face the risk of preemption under the E-Sign Act. As highlighted above, the E-Sign Act is 
deferential to states electronic signature laws only if they are consistent with the UETA, or if  
“alternative procedures or requirements for the use of acceptance (or both) of electronic 
signatures,” do not “require, or accord greater legal status or effect to, the implementation or 
application of a specific technology or technical specification for performing the functions of 
creating, storing, generating, receiving, communicating, or authenticating electronic records or 
electronic signatures.”133 By amending states UETA to broadly define blockchains and smart 
contracts, states risk, under a textualist interpretation of the E-Sign Act, attributing a “greater legal 
status” than had previously been granted to the defined technology, thus enabling preemption.134 
 
Therefore, if states feel compelled to adopt legislation affirming the enforceability of smart 
contracts (and they should not), and eliminate preemption concerns, legislatures should consider 
adopting a narrow approach, similar to the one taken by Nevada and Ohio.  Any proposed 
amendment could simply affirm that a blockchain can qualify as an “electronic record.”  By doing 
so, a legislature can ensure that any digital signature recorded to a blockchain is enforceable and 
further ensure that a smart contract will qualify as an electronic agent, since the term is defined in 
reference to “initiat[ing] an action or respond[ing] to electronic records or performances.”135   
 
                                                 
129 2017 Ariz. HB 2417 44-7061; 2018 N.Y. SB 8858; 2018 Tenn. SB 1662 47-10-201.  
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In terms of definitions, legislatures should adopt a broad definition of a blockchain—one 
that accommodates future implementations and architectures for blockchains which may emerge 
over time.  Nevada’s approach here is again instructive.  Nevada has defined a “blockchain” as 
“an electronic record of transactions or other data which is: (i) “[u]niformly ordered”; (ii) 
“[r]edundantly maintained or processed by one or more computers or machines to guarantee the 
consistency or nonrepudiation of the recorded transactions or other data; and (iii) [v]alidated by 
the use of cryptography.”136 The “Blockchain Technology Act” introduced in Illinois, defines a 
“blockchain” as an “electronic record created by the use of a decentralized method by multiple 
parties to verify and store a digital record of transactions which is secured by the use of a 
cryptographic hash of previous transaction information.”137 These definitions are detailed enough 
to differentiate a blockchain from other database structures, but broad enough to accommodate 
evolving architectures of blockchain technologies without resorting to vague, ambiguous terms 
like “ledger.”  
 
That being said, our analysis differs for states that have not adopted the UETA.  Illinois, New 
York, and Washington should contemplate amending their state statutes to recognize and 
accommodate the use of “electronic agents” to engage in commercial transactions.  Such an 
approach would harmonize these state statutes with the UETA and E-Sign Act and reduce any 
ambiguity around the use of a technological systems to assist with the execution of contractual 
performances and or whether the E-Sign Act could preempt these state laws. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 U.S. law largely accommodates the use of blockchain-based smart contracts to create 
binding and enforceable legal agreements, with limited exception. Under the statute of frauds and 
the U.C.C., parties should be able to rely on a smart contract to create enforceable legal 
agreements, if the smart contract outlines the material terms of the parties’ arrangement and if the 
parties digitally sign the agreement through some volitional act.  Enforceability concerns are 
decreased if parties incorporate, by reference, a smart contract, and rely on a “hybrid” contract that 
contains standard legal prose and references to relevant smart contract programs. 
 
Even if a legal agreement relying on a smart contract somehow is deemed not to satisfy the 
statute of frauds or the writing requirements of the U.C.C., parties attempting to challenge the 
enforceability of any such contract will face an uphill battle thanks to the broad provisions of the 
UETA and E-Sign Act.  These statutes likely will apply to contractual arrangement involving smart 
contracts, because a blockchain should qualify as an “electronic record” and because a smart 
contract should qualify as an “electronic agent.”   
 
As such, recent state amendments to the UETA are largely unnecessary. Indeed, the 
varying definitions of blockchain, for example, may create unintended roadblocks to innovation 
by creating unnecessary ambiguities and litigation. At most, New York, Illinois, and Washington 
should consider amending their state statutes to permit contracting via an “electronic agent.” 
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